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TEACHING CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
REBECCA ZIETLOW* 
Because I am a scholar of the Reconstruction Era, I always enjoy teaching 
the Fourteenth Amendment. I strongly believe that scholarship enhances 
classroom teaching and I welcome the opportunity to share my knowledge, 
gleaned from years of research, with my students. My work focuses on 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts. I have written extensively 
about the role that Congress plays in enforcing equality rights, which is rooted 
in the Reconstruction Era.1  
The Fourteenth Amendment is a rich source of material for my research, and 
for teaching constitutional law, because Section 5 of the Amendment authorizes 
Congress to enact “appropriate” measures to enforce the Amendment.2 
Congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment raises basic issues 
 
* Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. Visiting 
Professor, Vermont Law School, 2017-2018. 
 1. See, e.g., REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006) [hereinafter ZIETLOW, ENFORCING 
EQUALITY]; Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011) [hereinafter Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism]; Rebecca E. 
Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255 
(2010) [hereinafter Zietlow, Free at Last!]; Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of the 
Rights of Citizenship, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1015 (2008) [hereinafter Zietlow, Rights of Citizenship]; 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005) [hereinafter Zietlow, Secure These Rights]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. More recently, my scholarship has focused on the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which merits only a cursory mention in most constitutional law books. See, 
e.g., REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, THE FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR: JAMES MITCHELL ASHLEY AND THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF RECONSTRUCTION [hereinafter ZIETLOW, FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR]; 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley, the Great Strategist of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 265 (2017) [hereinafter Zietlow, Great Strategist]; Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive 
Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859 (2016) [hereinafter Zietlow, A Positive Right]; 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (2012) 
[hereinafter Zietlow, Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment]; Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological 
Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2012) [hereinafter Zietlow, Origins 
of the Thirteenth Amendment]; Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 1, at 255. I believe that the 
omission of the Thirteenth Amendment is a mistake, and with a group of other Thirteenth 
Amendment scholars, have sought to revive interest in that amendment. Of course, that issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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such as individual rights, federalism, and separation of powers. Section 5 could, 
and arguably should, be a central component of the constitutional law 
curriculum. However, constitutional law textbooks vary in their coverage of 
Section 5 and finding time and space within the standard constitutional law 
curriculum to teach this important subject has proven to be quite a challenge. 
Nonetheless, teaching about congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment not only furthers the understanding of the Amendment, but also 
provides an excellent opportunity for teaching about the role of the political 
branches in constitutional development.  
Teaching congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment raises a 
larger issue—to what extent can and should law professors teach about 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts as part of a standard 
constitutional law curriculum? Like many (probably most) constitutional law 
professors, I teach a lot of history in my class. I believe it is necessary to 
understand the historical context of landmark Supreme Court cases to fully 
understand the Court’s rulings. In addition, students traditionally enjoy studying 
the historical background of these cases, and I am convinced that interest in a 
subject is correlated with enhanced learning. A historical approach to 
constitutional law also enables me to use my research to add value to the class. 
Because of the political nature of constitutional law, I teach a lot about 
politics. I often use examples from contemporary headlines to illustrate doctrines 
that we cover in class. When I ask students to consider the constitutionality of a 
political act, I want them to consider the Supreme Court rulings we have read, 
but also to go beyond what the Court would say. Often, the answer is not clear, 
and is subject to negotiation by the political branches. Constitutional 
interpretation in the real world frequently occurs outside of the courts, through 
the political actions of the political branches. It is essential for students to learn 
about constitutional interpretation outside of the courts to understand how 
constitutional law develops in our country. 
Teaching congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides a valuable opportunity to teach about the complex and conflicting 
interaction between the courts and the political branches related to discerning 
constitutional meaning. However, deciding whether, and to what extent, to teach 
congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment entails balancing 
history, politics, and constitutional theory with the black letter law that students 
need to know for the bar exam. 
Part I of this Essay considers in depth how and when to teach congressional 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment in a constitutional law course. Part 
II considers a larger problem—how to teach constitutional interpretation by the 
political branches when the Supreme Court dominates the teaching and study of 
constitutional law. Part III provides suggestions on how to use Section 5 as a 
vehicle for teaching how members of Congress interpret the Constitution when 
enacting measures to define and protect equality rights. 
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I.  WHY AND WHEN TO TEACH CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment is important for 
both historical and theoretical reasons. Historically, the primary purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to empower Congress to enforce the rights listed in 
the Amendment against state governments.3 Twenty-first century lawyers 
(including a majority of the Supreme Court) tend to think of the Court as the 
primary enforcer of individual rights, including those in Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.4 Members of the Reconstruction Congress, however, 
viewed the Supreme Court as a threat to individual rights, not as their protector.5 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected that Congress would play 
the leading role in defining and enforcing individual rights.6 Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, not Brown v. Board of Education, was the paradigm of the Court 
which the Reconstruction Congress viewed as an instrument of the “Slave 
Power.”7 Thus, teaching about congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment helps students to understand the original meaning of the 
Amendment.8 
Congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment also raises issues 
of constitutional theory, because it implicates the fundamental structure of U.S. 
government and the role of individual rights within that structure. When 
Congress enacts legislation pursuant to Section 5 to enforce rights against state 
governments, it infringes on state autonomy. Thus, Section 5 raises important 
federalism issues. Which level of government, state or federal, should be 
primarily responsible for protecting individual rights?9 Section 5 also raises 
fascinating issues of separation of powers—what is the proper division of 
authority over those rights between the Court and Congress? To what extent can 
members of Congress define constitutional meaning when legislating to protect 
 
 3. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13 
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
 4. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524–25 (1997). 
 5. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 33. 
 6. Zietlow, Rights of Citizenship, supra note 1, at 1028. 
 7. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court held that slaveholders had a constitutional right to 
own slaves, and that people of African descent could not be U.S. citizens. 60 U.S. 393, 453–54 
(1857). Republicans in the 39th Congress widely decried the Dred Scott decision as a political 
ruling serving the Slave Power. See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 29–36. 
Almost a century later, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that state-mandated 
segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Scholars often invoke Brown to argue that the Court plays a leading role 
in protecting equality rights. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 7. 
 8. Although I do not consider myself to be an originalist, the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision is at least relevant, if not decisive, to interpreting its meaning today. 
 9. See Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and 
Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2005). 
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rights that they identify in the Fourteenth Amendment? What is the process 
Congress uses when legislating to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment? How 
does that differ from the judicial process? These important questions are open to 
discussion when teaching congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Indeed, congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment raises a 
multitude of fundamental constitutional law issues and concepts, which justifies 
its addition to the constitutional law curriculum. But where is its proper place in 
the curriculum? 
A. Finding a Home for Section Five 
The most natural home for a discussion of Section 5 at my law school, the 
University of Toledo College of Law, appears to be Constitutional Law I (“Con 
Law I”). Con Law I is a required course that most students take in their second 
semester of law school. The curriculum of Con Law I includes the federal 
powers (judicial, executive, and legislative); the separation of those powers and 
checks and balances; federalism limits on federal power and the Tenth 
Amendment; limitations on the power of states, including an introduction to the 
Fourteenth Amendment; the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
the Bill of Rights; and the Fourteenth Amendment-based doctrine of substantive 
due process.10 Section 5 seems to fit in the Con Law I curriculum because Con 
Law I includes the powers of Congress and introduces the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Indeed, I try to include a unit about Section 5 in my Con Law I 
curriculum. However, the complexity of the issues surrounding Section 5 make 
it difficult to accommodate into a first-year constitutional law course. 
There are several reasons why it is difficult to fit a unit on congressional 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in the first semester of 
constitutional law. First and foremost, it is hard to find time to cover it. The list 
of subjects already covered in Con Law I illustrates that there is already limited 
time to teach the rest of the curriculum. Second, Section 5 jurisprudence is 
complicated and multi-layered and includes background information that we 
would not otherwise cover in Con Law I. City of Boerne v. Flores is the case in 
which the Court established the test for evaluating the propriety of congressional 
measures enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.11 In Boerne, the Court 
 
 10. At the University of Toledo College of Law, we standardize our constitutional law 
curriculum into two required semesters. This system enables students to take the second semester 
of constitutional law (“Con Law II”) with a different professor than the professor who taught them 
Con Law I if they prefer or if their schedule so requires. The constitutional law professors meet 
regularly to discuss our curriculum and to ensure that we teach a consistent curriculum. However, 
we do not all use the same textbook. 
 11. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). A comprehensive treatment of Section 5 would also include 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, an act enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.12 The first question which an astute law student might ask is, what 
does a First Amendment case have to do with the Fourteenth Amendment? The 
answer, of course, is that the First Amendment only applies to state governments 
because it was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment. I do teach 
incorporation in Con Law I, but usually not until after the unit on the powers of 
Congress. The issue of incorporation alone thus generates a timing problem, 
which is relatively minor. The larger issue is the fact that the decision in Boerne 
turns on the conflict between the Court and Congress interpreting the meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Students need some 
background in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence to understand Boerne, but we 
do not cover the First Amendment until Con Law II.  
In Boerne, the Court established a “congruence and proportionality” test to 
evaluate whether Section 5-based legislation falls within Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The congruence and proportionality test 
is sui generis and does not apply to any other area of the Court’s jurisprudence.14 
Therefore, students cannot understand it unless they study cases in which the 
Court applies it. The next problem, then, is teaching the cases following Boerne. 
However, students first need at least a short lesson on the Eleventh Amendment 
and sovereign immunity from Seminole Tribe v. Florida.15 In Seminole Tribe, 
the Court held that Congress could not use the Indian Commerce Clause to make 
individual rights enforceable against state governments.16 After Seminole Tribe, 
Section 5 is the only permissible source of power to abrogate sovereign 
immunity. Section 5 cases post-Boerne almost always involve legislation in 
which Congress purports to make rights enforceable against state 
governments.17 Therefore, teaching Section 5 entails adding the Eleventh 
 
 12. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
 13. Id. at 520. 
 14. The one exception is Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. At times, the 
Court has treated the Enforcement Clauses of the two amendments interchangeably. See, e.g., 
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651. The Court recently applied the congruence and proportionality test 
to a Fifteenth Amendment-based voting rights statute. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2627–28 (2013). 
 15. 517 U.S. 43, 47, 52–53 (1996). 
 16. See id. at 47. 
 17. See, e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003) (upholding a 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act which applies to states as employers as falling 
within Congress’s Section 5 power); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 
373–74 (2001) (striking down a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act which prohibited 
disability discrimination by states as employers as beyond Congress’s Section 5 power); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (striking down a provision of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act which prohibited age discrimination by states as employers as beyond 
Congress’s Section 5 power). 
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Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, topics usually consigned 
to federal courts classes, into the Con Law I curriculum. Post-Boerne Section 5 
cases often involve congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, 
the doctrine of which is not covered until Con Law II. Obviously, teaching all 
this additional doctrine takes time and adds difficulty to the standard Con Law I 
curriculum. If we do cover all this jurisprudence, there is almost no time 
remaining for the important subject of substantive due process at the end of the 
semester. Thus, teaching the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence is difficult. 
Given the obstacles to teaching congressional power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Con Law I, another option would be to teach it in Con 
Law II. Con Law II is a required course, but students can opt to take it at any 
time after their first year of law school, and they can also choose which professor 
to teach them. I love this system because it means that most, though not all, of 
my Con Law II students chose to take the class with me instead of the other 
constitutional law professors who teach it. While I cannot assume that all the 
students in my Con Law II class like me, I can mostly rest assured that they do 
not hate me, so I feel like I have a bit more latitude and flexibility to teach during 
that semester. In addition, Con Law II students are a bit more seasoned and 
sophisticated than the first-year students in my Con Law I class. Most 
importantly, Con Law II is the semester that students like because it covers juicy 
issues like equality and discrimination, as well as fascinating and politically 
relevant First Amendment doctrine. Happier students are more open to 
learning—perhaps this is the semester to teach Section 5. 
There are several pedagogical reasons to teach Section 5 in Con Law II. 
Students have already learned about incorporation, so there is no need to explain 
that aspect of the Boerne case. This is the semester that we cover the Equal 
Protection Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
However, the question of timing looms even larger in Con Law II. I begin the 
semester with the Equal Protection Clause, and I usually do not teach the Free 
Exercise Clause until the end of the semester. Should I teach Boerne during my 
unit on equal protection, or wait until the very end of the semester after the 
religion clauses? More importantly, the Con Law II curriculum consists almost 
entirely of Supreme Court cases interpreting the Constitution. No matter how 
the timing goes, the switch from the powers of the Court to a discussion of the 
powers of Congress would likely be awkward. In addition, Boerne is only 
nominally about federalism. The Boerne Court is most concerned about 
separation of powers, the division of interpretive authority between the Court 
and Congress. While we talk a lot about federalism in Con Law II, issues of 
separation of powers are generally consigned to Con Law I. Thus, teaching 
Section 5 in Con Law II is likely to be an awkward fit. 
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II.  TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BY THE POLITICAL 
BRANCHES 
Fortunately, teaching Boerne and its progeny is not the only approach 
available for teaching congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court defines the scope of Congress’s Section 
5 power. However, Boerne and its progeny are only marginally about what 
Congress actually does when enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
comprehensive treatment of Section 5 would shift the focus away from the 
Court, and toward Congress, including congressional deliberations on 
legislation which enforces the Fourteenth Amendment. However, constitutional 
law textbooks for law students rarely include congressional deliberations on 
legislation.18 This highlights a broader issue in the teaching of constitutional law 
in law schools—the extent to which the judicial power dominates how lawyers 
think and learn about the Constitution. Constitutional law textbooks for law 
students consist almost exclusively of U.S. Supreme Court cases, interspersed 
with some background material. I am not aware of any constitutional law 
textbook for law students which extensively covers constitutional interpretation 
outside of the courts.19 Some textbooks take a historical approach and cover 
constitutional interpretation by the coordinate federal branches and state 
officials to contextualize Supreme Court decisions.20 By and large, however, law 
students are taught that the Constitution means what the U.S. Supreme Court 
says it means. 
Judicial supremacy dominates constitutional law—at least the way it is 
taught in law schools. There are some very good reasons to teach constitutional 
law this way. Perhaps most importantly, the bar exam tests mostly Supreme 
Court doctrine, and constitutional law is heavily tested on the bar exam. Also, 
students want answers! They want to know what the black letter law is and 
 
 18. The one statute that is included in many constitutional law textbooks is the 1973 War 
Powers Act, which is often included in material covering the war powers of Congress and the 
President, and the division of power between the two branches. However, those textbooks do not 
usually include congressional debates over the Act. 
 19. When I refer to textbooks throughout this Essay, I am referring to constitutional law 
textbooks which are designed for teaching students in law schools. As I will discuss, teaching 
constitutional law in an undergraduate course would allow for a more holistic approach to 
constitutional law which would encompass the subjects that most interest me. I have used a wide 
variety of textbooks during my years teaching constitutional law, including: ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006); 1 MICHAEL K. CURTIS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
CONTEXT (2003); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (17th 
ed. 2010); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2009); DAVID S. 
SCHWARTZ & LORI A. RINGHAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE 
CASEBOOK (2013). Some constitutional law textbooks designed for undergraduate courses do cover 
this subject, notably the GILMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM series. 
 20. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2006); CURTIS ET AL., supra note 19; STONE ET AL., supra note 19. 
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teaching the nuance of constitutional interpretation outside of the courts could 
frustrate these students. Nonetheless, we constitutional law professors are doing 
our students a great disservice if we teach them that constitutional law is limited 
to Supreme Court rulings. A large amount of constitutional law is created by the 
federal branches interacting with each other and negotiating with the states. 
Political scientists have long known this, and their work on constitutional 
development outside of the courts can greatly enrich our understanding of the 
Constitution.21 Recently, a growing number of law professors have also begun 
to study popular constitutionalism, or constitutional interpretation outside of the 
courts.22 This wealth of scholarship should inform what we teach our students. 
We are selling our students short when we only teach about the Constitution via 
the exercise of judicial review. A great deal of constitutional doctrine is 
developed outside of the courts, and students who are not taught about it lack a 
fundamental understanding of the workings of our constitutional government. 
In my view, the most interesting aspects of constitutional law are its history 
and political implications. Teaching this to students raises a paradox—we want 
them to think about how constitutional law actually develops in our country, but 
we also want them to learn constitutional doctrine. In today’s post-modern 
world, students are all too eager to jump to the conclusion that rulings are based 
on politics.23 While they are undoubtedly correct that politics affect the Court’s 
rulings, students must learn the doctrine despite its political origins. 
Unfortunately, their cynicism can sometimes impede their learning of the 
doctrine. By contrast, thinking about politics does not interfere with learning 
about constitutional interpretation by the political branches. That process is 
overtly political and more transparent than judicial deliberations. That is one of 
the reasons why it is so interesting. Unfortunately, many of my students have 
trouble understanding this nuanced approach to constitutional interpretation. I 
am sure that I am not the only constitutional law professor that receives student 
 
 21. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL 
PROCESS (1988); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013); Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into 
Judicial Decisions: Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 487 (2004). 
 22. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 (2004); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE 
L.J. 941, 943 (1997); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
1947 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000); Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). 
 23. There is ample evidence to support this view. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE 
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
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evaluations that are divided between “too much history” and “not enough 
history” when evaluating the same class. An in-depth discussion of 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts may warrant a similar 
response. However, this subject is too important not to make the effort. 
Many constitutional law professors do teach about the political context of 
major constitutional crises and shifts in the Court’s jurisprudence. For example, 
a unit on the development of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence would 
be incomplete without a discussion of the Depression, the New Deal, and the 
resultant rise of the administrative state. It’s hard to imagine teaching the Court’s 
equal protection race discrimination jurisprudence without discussing the 
history of Jim Crow and the twentieth-century civil rights movement. Similarly, 
teaching the congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment from 
the perspective of Congress provides a valuable opportunity to teach about 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts. 
III.  A VEHICLE FOR TEACHING CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Some of the cases which we already teach in the standard constitutional law 
curriculum provide an opportunity to teach congressional enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from Congress’s perspective. The canonical Civil 
Rights Cases, the case where the Supreme Court established the state action 
limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment, is a good place to start.24 The Civil 
Rights Cases is usually taught in a unit about the state action requirement, but it 
provides a great introduction to the Section 5 power from Congress’s 
perspective. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court imposed an important limitation 
on the Section 5 power when it struck down the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibited race discrimination by privately owned places of public 
accommodation, as beyond Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.25 That ruling, which continues in effect to this day, means that 
when members of Congress want to enact civil rights legislation, they cannot 
use the Section 5 power to regulate private action. Thus, they must resort to an 
alternative source of power, such as the Commerce Clause. Teaching about the 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides an opportunity to teach more 
about congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts in general. To learn about the 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, students must learn about the political 
dynamics of the Depression, the New Deal, and President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
court-packing plan and its impact on the Court. As a result of those politics, the 
 
 24. 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). 
 25. Id. at 9–10. 
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Court adopted a broad test for evaluating the commerce power, which enabled 
Congress to enact civil rights measures.26 
Considering congressional deliberations over civil rights legislation in the 
late twentieth century provides an excellent opportunity to teach students about 
congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment as an exercise of 
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts. One of the landmark 
Commerce Clause cases is Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the case in 
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination in privately owned places of public 
accommodation.27 The 1964 Civil Rights Act was similar to the 1875 measure 
that the Court struck down in the Civil Rights Cases. Members of Congress 
debated whether to rely on Section 5 when enacting Title II but felt constrained 
by the state action limitation in the Civil Rights Cases.28 They debated whether 
to rely on Section 5 or the commerce power, which the Court had broadened in 
its New Deal era opinions. Ultimately, supporters of the legislation decided to 
rely on both, but to emphasize the commerce power when defending the 
constitutionality of that measure before the Supreme Court.29 In Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, the Court relied on the commerce power in its decision upholding the 
constitutionality of Title II.30 The Court’s majority opinion sidestepped the 
Section 5 issue even though the measure was about racial equality.31 However, 
in their concurrences, Justices Douglas and Goldberg argued that the act fell 
within Congress’s Section 5 Power.32 As Justice Clark read his majority opinion 
from the bench, Justice Douglas passed a note to Justice Goldberg which said 
that he was happy that they had written separately.33 Goldberg passed a note 
back, which said “Bill: I agree most emphatically. It sounds like hamburgers are 
more important than human rights. Arthur.”34 Thus, members of Congress and 
members of the Court were engaged in a dialogue about constitutional meaning, 
in which both were constrained by precedents from the past. 
The dialogue between the Court and Congress was renewed, this time with 
negative results, in the case of United States v. Morrison.35 In Morrison, the 
Court struck down the civil rights remedy provision of the Violence Against 
 
 26. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
 27. 379 U.S. 241, 242–43 (1964). 
 28. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 114. 
 29. See id. at 114–15; Post, supra note 22, at 39. 
 30. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250. 
 31. Id. 
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Women Act enacted in 2000.36 Again, Congress had relied on the commerce 
power and Section 5 to enact civil rights legislation.37 In Congress, supporters 
of the bill argued that they could use their Section 5 power to remedy the states’ 
failure to protect women from gender-motivated violence.38 In Morrison, the 
Court applied the Boerne congruence and proportionality test and disagreed, 
striking down the measure as beyond the scope of both the Section 5 power and 
the commerce power.39 This time, the Court rejected Congress’s 
characterization of the law as a civil rights measure and its interpretation of 
Section 5.40 Both Heart of Atlanta and Morrison are generally covered as 
Commerce Clause cases, but they are also about Section 5. These Commerce 
Clause cases, already covered in most textbooks, provide contrasting examples 
of the conversation between the Courts and Congress about constitutional 
meaning. It would also be relatively easy to add segments of the congressional 
debates over the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Violence Against Women Act to 
the coverage of those cases. Thus, they provide a good opportunity to teach 
about congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
Congress’s perspective, and to explore the interaction between the Court and 
Congress regarding Congress’s exercise of this power. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to teach constitutional law. Students like bright-line rules and 
want the answers to doctrinal questions. Instead, constitutional law is full of 
fuzzy lines and balancing tests. This makes constitutional law a great class for 
teaching legal reasoning and argument, but frustrating for students who want 
answers and professors who want to give them. When teaching constitutional 
law, there is always a need to balance interesting content with rules that students 
need to know. History is interesting, as is constitutional theory. I believe that 
students learn better when they are interested in what they are studying. But 
some students are not interested in history and theory. Other students are too 
interested, and don’t learn the law because they only focus on history and theory. 
It is a tough balancing act for professors and students and adding constitutional 
interpretation by the political branches further complicates this balancing act. 
Teaching about congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment can 
complicate this balancing act, but also make it more rewarding. I will continue 
to struggle with this balance, which makes teaching constitutional law both so 
challenging and so continually engaging. 
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